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Abstract
Journalists have the power to enhance the visibility of certain aspects of campaign 
issues and, thus, are relevant mediators between political actors and citizens. To serve 
the public interest, news media coverage should include the views of different political 
camps and should enable citizens to build opinions in an enlightened way. The authors 
analyze journalists’ framing of the coverage of a 2008 campaign on the naturalization 
of immigrants. Content analysis was conducted of all campaign coverage by TV stations 
and major newspaper outlets over a period of 14 weeks. To identify dominant frames, 
the authors coded all campaign arguments made in news media coverage (N = 3,570). 
The results show that media coverage focused on three substantive frames—rule 
of law, mass naturalization, and people’s final say. The findings reveal that coverage 
was not balanced but was clearly in favor of the rule of law frame. This framing bias 
applies to different types of media, including public service TV and elite newspapers. 
Furthermore, the authors found a striking bias toward institutional actors, who were 
covered much more often than civil society actors.
Keywords
frame selection, framing, media bias
Traditional mass media still play an important role as mediators between citizens and 
political actors. The news media “mediate between the citizenry . . . and the institu-
tions involved in government, electoral processes, or, more generally, opinion 
Article
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formation” (Strömbäck, 2008, p. 230). Modern news media serve as the main source 
of information for citizens. And already “some minimal level of information facilitates 
the exercise of citizenship” (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008, p. 717). Political news coverage 
is “the currency on which democracy operates” (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1994, p. 35). 
To make enlightened voting choices, citizens must have access to political informa-
tion, and it is important to note that the ways in which the media cover politics affect 
voters (Druckman & Parkin, 2005). News media outlets “highlight certain issues, 
frame events in particular ways, and portray candidates in varying lights” (Druckman 
& Parkin, 2005, p. 1030). Hence, from the normative perspective of traditional journal-
ism and in keeping with the notion of social responsibility (McQuail, 2008), the media 
are expected to transparently cover politics and to offer places to all different kinds of 
positions, to implement neutrality, objectivity, independence, and unbiased framing in 
their coverage. However, “recent theoretical work in economics shows that under 
competition and diversity of opinion, newspapers will provide content that is more 
biased” (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008).
Commercialization and mediatization challenge the traditional functions of news 
and journalism in democracy. News media as—in most cases—privately owned enti-
ties have to be substantially financed to produce quality news. Today, financial data 
have at least the same importance as journalistic norms in the daily lives of editors and 
journalists. The tensions between commercial and journalistic goals have become very 
strict. This is especially true in the case of political news coverage. Traditionally, jour-
nalists’ decisions are driven by editorial and corporate norms, principles, and routines. 
Journalistic norms such as diversity, objectivity, and truth are still ideal objectives for 
many journalists, if not always possible to achieve. But today, another force must be 
considered: market pressure. Most media companies have to survive in a dynamic 
market environment with changing technological, social, and political preconditions 
and increasing competition for the attention of media consumers. Now, market-driven 
media are not necessarily expected to invest in commenting or in extensive factual 
reporting on direct democratic campaigns. Moreover, to save money, market-driven 
media can be expected to heavily rely on news agencies as sources of coverage, instead 
of investigations by their own journalists. The story is different for public service 
media. Unbiased, neutral, and resource-intense coverage is one reason for their pure 
existence.
Media companies need to sell their content to their audiences, and—in the case of pri-
vate companies, more importantly—to advertisers. They use their brands to signal quality 
and competence (Siegert, Gerth, & Rademacher, 2011). New, competing channels, such as 
the Internet, mobile communications, and free newspapers, have permanently changed this 
environment in the past 25 years. Professional journalistic entities have reacted by install-
ing professional management competences in and around their newsrooms.
Political actors aim to influence the judgment and voting decisions of citizens, but 
most have very limited resources (e.g., financial resources) to contact their target audi-
ences via their own organizational channels (e.g., party newsletters) or paid media 
(e.g., political advertising). Thus, getting access to journalists and the editorial content 
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of the mass media is crucial for political parties and organizations as well as for indi-
vidual politicians and their staffs. However, getting access and being considered a 
source for media coverage is only the first step in this process. Political actors want to 
get not only their general message across but also their framing of this message (see 
Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012). Public relations (PR) offer the means to communicate and 
influence journalists’ decisions. With successful PR work, political actors get access to 
editorial content in the media that they do not have to pay for (earned media; Schnur, 
1999, p. 146), as they do for political advertising. In some cases, this also has the 
advantage of enabling political actors to “transfer” the credibility of certain media 
outlets to their own messages (Baker, 2002, p. 12; McManus, 1995, p. 322). The suc-
cess of this strategy depends heavily on the way the media treat political PR messages 
and on the degree of PR professionalization in political organizations. It depends on 
the strength of “networks of professional communicators” (Entman, Matthes, & 
Pellicano, 2009, p. 176) who are able to select aspects of a topic and construct mes-
sages that find their way into the media. If journalists interpret these messages in the 
ways intended by their sources, strategic communication has been successful.
Political PR has become professionalized during the past few decades, as a result of 
the decline of the traditional party press. At the same time, the media have developed 
their own logic of reporting politics. Altheide and Snow (1979), therefore, have intro-
duced the notion of “media logic.” The transition from the traditional media–politics 
relation to a new quality of relationship further developed in the 1980s (Mazzoleni, 
1987). “The party logic no longer favours one party or ideology, but is instead guided by 
balance, fairness and a sacerdotal approach toward political actors” (van Aelst, Maddens, 
Noppe, & Fiers, 2008, p. 196).
Thus, the presentation of political actors as well as the framing choices of journal-
ists are also guided by journalistic criteria—and not only by party-specific ones. 
Recent results in communication research have revealed that political actors are not 
the dominant force in the framing of political messages. “The fact that both journalists 
and politicians agree that the journalists have the ultimate power over the framing of 
the news is rather striking, especially in light of the discussion about the professional-
ization of political campaigning, spin-doctors and news management” (Strömbäck & 
Nord, 2006). Now, based on this development, we could expect the news media to 
cover politics using their own media logic—at least to some extent, depending on the 
type of media outlet (e.g., factual in elite media, personalized in tabloid media, and 
regionalized in regional media)—and to make their own framing choices. However, 
the question remains of whether this holds true for structured types of political com-
munication, such as direct democratic campaigns and, if so, to what extent. 
Furthermore, as has been shown in previous research, countries with long traditions 
of direct democracy have institutionalized their processes of direct democracy (Gerth, 
Rademacher, Pühringer, Dahinden, & Siegert, 2009). This is true not only for politi-
cal institutions but also for journalism and journalistic behavior. In this context, the 
general framework for campaign coverage is set, and journalists develop a routine 
business for conducting campaign coverage.
 at Vienna University Library on February 16, 2012abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
282  American Behavioral Scientist 56(3)
In this interaction of journalists and political actors, institutional actors have an 
advantage. Following many authors in the field, we can expect high-level govern-
ment representatives to be the main sources for political news coverage (Bennett, 
1990; Gans, 1979; Tresch, 2009). They have “a bonus in the distribution of media 
attention” (van Aelst et al., 2008). This also applies to Switzerland, where, as stated 
by Tresch (2009, p. 85), the “media mostly . . . reproduce existing hierarchies and 
structures of influence.” This reflects the media logic of selecting sources. It also 
refers to what Bennett (1990) has called “indexing,” which is nothing but “a weight-
ing system for what gets into the news” (Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007, 
p. 49). Thus, the consequence of the lower prominence of representatives of the polit-
ical elite is lower visibility in the media (de Vreese & Semetko, 2004). We, therefore, 
expect members of the government to be covered more prominently than other types 
of political actors.
In this article, we offer descriptive insights into how the news media cover direct 
democratic campaigns. We analyzed media content and shed light on the framing of 
the campaign on the naturalization of immigrants. Our aim was to compare the fram-
ing presented by different types of media outlets and at different points in time during 
14 weeks of campaigning. Furthermore, we analyzed different types of political actors 
and their appearances in the media. Media bias theory predicts that we should find bias 
in the coverage of the two opposing camps. However, Tresch (2009, p. 80), for exam-
ple, has found that the direction of bias in the media varies—“there is hardly any evi-
dence that media decisions are biased toward parliamentarians of a particular partisan 
color”—and so the media are not always favoring the same political camp. In the first 
part of this article, we present some thoughts on the role of journalists and the mass 
media in framing political campaigns. We then develop four hypotheses and present our 
methodological approach. We then move on, in the second section, to present a general 
depiction of the campaign and our sample of media outlets, before analyzing the frames 
presented by journalists and political actors who appeared in campaign coverage in the 
third and final section.
The Media and Framing of Political Messages
Changes in the media and political communication environment have, obviously, 
consequences for the traditional logic of journalistic norms and routines and, thus, 
for media content. The process of news production and selection has become com-
mercialized (McManus, 2009), political communication has become professional-
ized (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999), and content has become mediatized (Mazzoleni 
& Schulz, 1999; Lundby, 2009). Not only story and source selection but also the 
framing choices of journalists are potentially highly influenced by these processes. 
By their own contributions to the framing of political messages—and, in our case, 
direct democratic campaigns—journalists make certain aspects more salient and 
present them in particular styles and contexts. The important question is how they 
do this.
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Following other contributors to this issue (Hänggli, 2012; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012; 
Matthes, 2012; Schemer, Wirth, & Matthes, 2012; Wettstein, 2012), we use the defini-
tion of framing offered by Entman (1993):
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular prob-
lem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment and 
recommendation for the item described. (p. 52)
This definition is more precise than understanding frames as only “central organizing 
ideas that provide coherence to a designated set of idea elements” (Ferree, Gamson, 
Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002, p. 105; for this argument, see Matthes, 2009; Matthes & 
Kohring, 2008). Frames “invoke the same objects and traits, using identical or synony-
mous words and symbols in a series of similar communications that are concentrated 
in time” (Entman et al., 2009, p. 177). A direct democratic campaign offers the perfect 
communication situation, as it is “concentrated in time”—in our case 14 weeks—and 
serves as a “series of similar communication.” In accordance with the general research 
focus on this issue, we use substantive frames as the leading concept (Entman, 2004). 
Our frames are issue specific (de Vreese, 2005; Matthes, 2009), and they are specific 
to the direct democratic campaign we analyzed. In addition to the three issue-specific, 
substantive frames that we identified for our direct democratic campaign (Hänggli, 
2012), we found a certain amount of contest frames in the news coverage. This type of 
frame normally appears without any issue-specific content. It is about contests between 
political actors, personal attacks, horse-race coverage (Iyengar, Norpoth, & Hahn, 
2004), personalization, and so forth.
Based on the theoretical framework presented above, our aim is to answer the fol-
lowing research questions: How do different types of media outlets cover direct demo-
cratic campaigns? What kinds of actors do they cite? and What kinds of frames are 
they using? With the hypotheses presented below, we focus on the intensity of cover-
age, the bias of political actors, and bias in the framing of the coverage:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Market-driven media, such as tabloids and free newspapers, 
invest considerably less in the coverage of political campaigns and rely con-
siderably more on journalistic routines than other media, such as elite and 
regional newspapers as well as public service TV.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The framing of market-driven media, such as tabloids and 
free newspapers, is considerably more biased than the framing of other 
media, such as elite and regional newspapers, as well as public service TV.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The fewer resources the media put into the coverage of direct 
democratic campaigns, the smaller the diversity of coverage and thus the 
greater the bias toward one side of the campaign.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Government and parliamentary representatives are covered 
more prominently than individuals or organizations representing civil society.
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Method
Context
The context of our study was a popular initiative voted on in June 2008 in Switzerland. 
The initiative was launched by the populist right party. Citizens were asked if they 
wanted to accept strict rules on the naturalization of immigrants. Basically, the question 
was whether Swiss citizens themselves should decide on naturalizations in open assem-
blies or whether semiprofessional committees should decide on naturalizations. 
Another controversial issue was whether immigrants should have the right to bring 
assemblies’ or committees’ decisions to court.
In this initiative, we identified three substantive frames, used by the pro and contra 
sides. These frames were operationalized by the campaign arguments offered by the 
pro and contra camps in the campaign. The “rule of law” frame, mainly used by 
opponents of the initiative, addressed the fairness of naturalization procedures that 
some argued should be oriented toward protecting basic human rights and adhering 
to constitutional rules. According to proponents of this frame, immigrants should be 
able to go to court when they do not feel fairly treated while going through the pro-
cess of naturalization. For the pro side, naturalizations were political, rather than 
administrative or legalistic, acts. Thus, the pro side focused on the “people’s final 
say” frame. This line of argument rested on the notion that the people should have the 
right to make final decisions about naturalizations, without the aid of any legal instru-
ment. According to advocates of the “people’s final say” position, the possibility of 
going to court should not exist. In addition to those in the “people’s final say” and 
“rule of law” camps, there were some who addressed rather xenophobic fears. They 
told voters that “mass naturalizations” had to be avoided and that this would not be 
possible until the initiative was adopted. Thus, for our analysis, the third frame we 
identified was the “mass naturalization” frame.
The frames we identified were used by different kinds of political actors. Switzerland 
is a highly fragmented, multiparty system that is divided into three different poles: the 
left (dominated by Social Democrats [SP] and the Greens), the moderate center-right 
(dominated by the Liberal Free Democrats [FDP] and the Christian Democrats [CVP]), 
and the populist right (dominated by the Swiss People’s Party [SVP]; Kriesi & Trechsel, 
2008; Linder, 1998). Apart from parties, there are many interest associations, such as 
economic interest groups and trade unions, but also more specialized groups (e.g., pro-
fessional associations) and experts (e.g., scientists and consultants) who play a role in 
direct democratic campaigns. Small parties often lack financial resources to campaign 
and need to rely on powerful interest groups for financial support, so that it is not always 
easy to distinguish between the impact of parties and interest groups (Kriesi, 2005). 
Citizens’ interest groups, such as organizations representing the “new social move-
ments,” can also play a role in direct democratic campaigns. All these different kinds of 
actors build ad hoc coalitions (“campaign committees”) for individual campaign issues. 
They are campaigning not only as single organizations but also as groups of actors with 
mutual sets of interests. Our analysis distinguishes between individuals (individual 
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actors) and their institutional origins, on one hand, and party origins, on the other. 
Individuals were coded according to their functions as, for example, parliamentarians 
and as party representatives. Thus, we present results on the levels of parties, organiza-
tions, and functions that individuals represented.
Sample
We analyzed the content of the main print and TV news media outlets in French- and 
German-speaking Switzerland throughout the campaign on naturalization, which lasted 
14 weeks. Our media sample consisted of 4 elite newspapers, 11 regional newspapers, 
4 tabloid newspapers, 3 free newspapers, and 2 weekly political news magazines. We 
also included 2 TV news programs and 3 political TV shows (in German and French) 
from Switzerland’s public broadcasting company. Overall, we coded the news content 
of 24 different newspapers and 5 different TV news programs.1
Measures
Using quantitative content analysis for data collection and data analysis (Krippendorff, 
2004; Neuendorf, 2002), we coded all arguments in the media coverage that was pre-
sented by political actors (individual and collective actors), journalists (e.g., in editori-
als), or authors of letters to the editor (total N = 3,570 arguments). We then assigned the 
arguments to abstract categories and used these as substantive frames. A reliability test 
at the frame level yielded satisfactory results (Cohen’s κ = .87). Thus, frames are sets of 
campaign-specific arguments. The three issue specific frames and the contest frames we 
identifies contained 93% (3,319) of all arguments. Of all arguments, 7% (251) did not 
fit into the frames.
Results
Our results are presented at the level of articles, the level of actors, and the level of 
frames. The latter includes the contra frame “rule of law,” the pro frames “people’s 
final say” and “mass naturalizations,” and contest frames. Arguments that could not 
be grouped into frames (n = 251) are not included in the presentation of results at the 
frame level.
Intensity of the Campaign and Visibility in the News
The campaign gained considerable visibility in the news. The media outlets in our 
sample produced a total of 688 articles and news reports throughout the 14 campaign 
weeks. News coverage reached a peak in weeks 11, 12, and 13 (see Figure 1). In the 
last week before the vote, most citizens had already cast their ballots by mail. To get 
an idea of the intensity of the campaign in different types of media, we can simply 
compare the number of articles published during the campaign. As we can see in Table 
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1, the naturalization campaign was the business of regional and elite media, whereas 
all other types of media together produced less than 10% of all articles and TV news 
reports. Our first hypothesis was confirmed.
A similar picture forms when we control for the amount of issues (i.e., the fre-
quency of publication) by different media outlets (e.g., weekly or Sunday newspapers 
vs. daily newspapers). Still, the dominant media outlets are elite newspapers, with 
more than one article per issue, and regional newspapers, with slightly less. Last, but 
not least, Table 1 offers an initial overview of the amount of frames counted in the 
media coverage. Separate from the number of articles, we can now see the contribu-
tion of public TV news to the debate (10.4% of all frames). This result again supports 
our first hypothesis. The campaign issue (role of immigrants, their integration and 
naturalization) was rather familiar to citizens and had been emotionally debated on a 
number of previous occasions. The issue was controversial and, thus, potentially inter-
esting to cover, even for the tabloid press. We need to stress, again, that most of the 
debate, including citizens’ opinions in letters to the editor, took place in elite and 
regional newspapers, as well as on public TV programs.
Table 1. Amount of Coverage in the Media
% of articles
Average number of 
articles per issue % of frames
Elite 20.35 1.1 20.53
Regional 69.04 0.91 61.99
Tabloid  4.80 0.28  3.70
Free  3.63 0.17  2.72
Newsmagazine  0.87 0.27  0.67
TV news  0.87 0.11  1.60
TV shows  0.44 —  8.80
n  688 — 3,570
0
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Figure 1. Quantity of articles per campaign week
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Overall, we can say that this is a considerable amount of coverage, comparable to 
other direct democratic campaigns (Gerth, Dahinden, & Siegert, in press). Of all arti-
cles, 35.9% published were letters to the editor, 24.1% were ordinary articles, 14.7% 
were journalistic comments and editorials, 12.6% were short notices, and 10.5% were 
more elaborate types of coverage, such as interviews, portraits, and reports. The small 
amount of resource-intense coverage confirms the market-influence hypothesis (H1) 
again. The large amount of letters to the editor indicates the controversy in the campaign 
and the high relevance of newspapers as a forum for political debate. In most cases, let-
ters to the editor were biased toward the pro or contra camp. Letters to the editor are 
where both readers and political actors react to newspaper coverage and present their 
own opinions. However, it is important to note that journalists still have control. They 
decide whether a letter gets published. Thus, they can choose to favor one side or 
another of a controversy, even if they receive more letters from one camp than from 
the other.
Our results show that journalists sometimes take a stand and even make clear voting 
recommendations. Of all articles, 14.7% had aspects of commentary, and the editors 
presented more or less their own views and sometimes directly recommended how to 
vote as part of their comments. In 4 (out of 72) articles of this type, even the title led to a 
voting recommendation: “This newspaper recommends. . . .” But, still, most of the cover-
age has to be considered factual and neutral, from the perspective of journalists, which 
means that opinion is brought into the coverage by direct citations of political actors’ 
arguments and not by journalists themselves. Thus, despite the decline and quasi-
disappearance of the traditional party press, media–party parallelism might still exist, 
but only to a very small extent (Tresch, 2009; van Kempen, 2007). Taking a stand and 
giving voting recommendations can, however, be seen not only as a transparent and 
consistent form of commentary but also as a violation of the journalistic principle of 
political independence (Curran, 2005). From the point of view of democratic theory, it 
seems more important that, throughout a campaign, both the pro and contra sides have 
access to the media.
Figure 1 shows how the campaign intensified, based on the number of articles and 
TV news reports, aggregated for campaign weeks. First, the campaign—after being 
covered at a very low level for some weeks—actually started only 6 weeks before 
the day of the vote. Second, we see that the media coverage reached its climax in the 
3rd and 2nd weeks before the vote. This result on the timing of news coverage of 
direct democratic campaigns is in line with what previous studies have revealed 
(e.g., de Vreese & Semetko, 2004). Finally, we see that coverage of the debate sig-
nificantly dropped, to a much lower level, in the last week before the vote. By that 
time, most people had already cast their votes by sending in official voting ballots 
(in some cases, even online voting was possible). The forms and codes (in the case 
of online voting) were distributed 4 weeks before the day of the vote. Thus, the vot-
ing procedure is likely to have reinforced the coverage pattern as an established 
routine: The majority of citizens cast their ballots by mail, that is, sent in a letter with 
their ballot some weeks before the official voting day (June 1, 2008).
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Framing of the Campaign in the News Media
We now move on to the distribution of the three issue-specific frames and the contest 
frames in different types of media outlets (n = 3,319). Here, again, we distinguish sev-
eral types of media. Furthermore, we distinguish types of cited actors: political actors 
(either as part of the pro or contra camps of the campaign or as single actors), journal-
ists who comment and bring in their own opinions, and authors of letters to the editor. 
In general, we have to note that the media coverage was rather constricted, as only three 
frames were salient. Table 2 shows a clear bias toward the contra camp. Of all frames 
presented in the media, 63.03% were connected to the contra camp. When we isolate 
the frames presented by journalists, the number rises to 89.33%. This is partly explained 
by the fact that only one of the four big parties was campaigning on the pro side (SVP).2 
The biggest total bias can be found in short notices (26.17% pro frames, 73.83% contra 
frames). This means that if journalists had to reduce their coverage to its essentials, they 
chose to do it in a biased way, favoring their own perceptions over balanced presenta-
tions of the pro and contra camp frames. The same applies for commentary coverage 
formats (62.92% contra frames). The bias is a little bit smaller when journalists start to 
invest more time and resources in coverage, as for interviews and reports (58.85% 
contra frames). This result supports H3.
Yet journalists still chose to include more actors from the contra camp in their 
coverage than actors from the pro side. If there is a bias, the bias has been actively 
produced by journalists. Even the findings for public TV news and shows are biased. 
Thus, H2 is definitely not supported. This hypothesis predicted that public media 
would deliver balanced and unbiased news, but this expectation was not fulfilled. 
Only TV shows are rather unbiased. This is not surprising at all, as an equal number 
of actors from both sides were invited to appear on TV, and it was the job of the pre-
senter to give a voice to both camps. In conclusion, with the exception of TV shows 
and, partly, news magazines, we find a rather consistent distribution of the two camps 
(see Table 3). The contra side was dominant, by two thirds. Based on the theory of 
media bias, this is not surprising and is in line with previous results (de Vreese & 
Semetko, 2004; Tresch, 2009).
Table 2. Distribution of Frames From the Pro and Contra Sides (N = 3,570 arguments)
Pro (%) Con (%)
Political actors (n = 2,330) 39.96 60.04
Journalists (n = 251) 10.76 89.24
Letters to the editor (n = 989) 36.50 63.50
Total  
 % 36.95 63.05
 n 1,319 2,251
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The distribution of frames was also rather consistent throughout the campaign. The 
pro and contra frames developed in similar ways during the 14 campaign weeks. 
Hence, in general, when the number of pro frames increased, the number of contra 
arguments increased, as well, and vice versa. Thus, we can say that the campaign was 
presented as controversial, to a certain extent, with both the pro and contra frames 
being present at the same time, but journalists clearly favoring contra frames over pro 
frames.
Figure 2 reveals that toward the end of the campaign, the pro and contra camps got 
almost the same amount of coverage. At the same time, commenting by journalists and 
the number of letters to the editor published in newspapers increased. This is an indica-
tor that citizens took part in the debate only toward the end of the campaign, when they 
filled out their ballots. In the first weeks of the campaign, coverage was closely linked 
to the public appearances of the pro and/or contra camps (e.g., press conferences, open 
debates). That is why we see big differences between the pro and contra camps in 
some of the early weeks of the campaign (see Figure 3).
The pattern of constriction toward the three frames is found throughout the cam-
paign. In all the campaign weeks, the media coverage was constricted toward the three 
frames. Throughout the campaign, the rule of law frame was also dominant in the 
media coverage (39.50% of all frames; see Table 4). The rule of law frame was, in most 
cases, connected to the contra camp, whereas the other two substantive frames were 
mainly connected to actors from the pro side. However, none of the frames was exclu-
sive to one camp. Rule of law frames were also used by the pro side. This means that 
the pro side repeated the main frame of the contra side to criticize it and bring it into 
perspective. We call this counterframing (Hänggli & Kriesi, 2012). Counterframes 
were used by the pro and contra sides quite often (see Table 4). As a result, pro and 
contra frames gained more prominence in the media than they would have by just being 
mentioned by their respective political camps. Political actors make strategic choices 
about whether to use their own arguments to positively support their positions or 
whether to try to explain to citizens why the arguments of their opponents are not con-
vincing. Each choice has its own advantages and pitfalls. As noted, we also coded 
personal attacks and contests between the two camps that were without any issue-specific 
Table 3. Distribution of Pro and Contra Frames in Different Types of Media
Pro (%) Con (%) n (N = 3,319)
Elite 33.58 66.42  679
Regional 36.39 63.61 2,058
Tabloid 36.59 63.41  123
Free 30.68 69.32   88
Newsmagazine 10.00 90.00   20
TV news 40.00 60.00   55
TV shows 52.03 47.97  296
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content (contest frames). In our data, contest frames were found in all types of actor 
categories. A total of 15.64% of all frames were identified as contest frames. Mostly, 
this way of framing the campaign was used by journalists, followed by political actors 
(on both the pro and contra sides) and authors of letters to the editor. Compared to the 
three substantive and issue-specific frames, issue-unspecific contest frames are of 
minor importance. Thus, the media presented a contest, but it was mostly a contest of 
arguments, personal attacks, and horse races.
Variations in how the campaign was framed by the different types of media outlets 
were rather weak. But, in general, again, the picture is rather consistent (see Table 5). 
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The contra frame rule of law was most important, followed by the pro frames people’s 
final say and mass naturalization. Only in the cases of news magazines and TV shows 
was the mass naturalization frame most important, followed by the rule of law frame 
and the people’s final say frame. Contest frames were mainly the business of the tab-
loid press (and news magazines, in our case), as expected, based on the fact that per-
sonalization is the core business of tabloid journalism (Gerth et al., 2009). Coverage 
of the campaign was limited to the three substantive frames in all types of media; only 
news magazines brought some new aspects to the debate, although on a very low 
level. Our second hypothesis was partly supported with regard to contest frames, but 
results on substantive frames do not support H2. We can say that the media did not 
make an effort to find new and surprising general aspects of the campaign. The topic 
was a familiar issue to journalists, political actors, and even citizens. The campaign 
was covered via routine interactions between political actors and journalists. The lat-
ter were following the work, news conferences, and public appearances of the politi-
cal elite (Kriesi, 2006) and mostly picked up arguments this way (Hänggli & Kriesi, 
2012).
Table 4. Frames Connected to Different Categories of Actors
Rule of 
law (%)
People’s final 
say (%)
Mass 
naturalization (%) Contest (%)
Pro camp (n = 931) 20.30 34.32 29.87 15.51
Contra camp (n = 1,399) 48.92 20.11 14.25 16.72
Journalists (n = 251) 44.89 15.11 18.67 21.33
Letters to the editor (n = 989) 43.20 29.05 14.91 12.84
Total  
 % 39.50 26.00 18.86 15.64
 n 1,311 863 626 519
Table 5. Framing in Different Types of Media
Rule of law 
(%)
People’s 
final say (%)
Mass 
naturalization (%)
Contest 
frames (%)
Elite (n = 679) 17.08 24.89 43.59 14.43
Regional (n = 2,058) 17.10 27.16 39.70 16.03
Tabloid (n = 123) 21.14 17.89 31.71 29.27
Free (n = 88) 10.23 20.45 50.00 19.32
Newsmagazine (n = 20) 40.00  5.00 20.00 35.00
TV news (n = 55) 18.18 20.00 41.82 20.00
TV show (n = 296) 35.47 28.04 29.73  6.76
Total (N = 3,319) 18.86 26.00 39.50 15.64
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Framing of the Pro and Contra Camps
Table 6 shows the framing of political actors in their roles as representatives of 
political organizations. Among different kinds of political organizations, including, 
for example, parties, business organizations, ad hoc campaign committees, and civil 
society actors, parties were, by far, the dominant type of organization in the media 
coverage. This confirms Höglinger’s (2008) earlier finding that political parties are 
reinforced during direct-democratic campaigns. Table 6 further reveals the dominance 
of the populist right party (SVP) in the pro camp and the frames people final’s say 
(64.57% of all SVP frames) and mass naturalization (74.94%). The rest of these two 
frames was shared by the other big parties. All used the contra frames as counter-
frames to strengthen their own positions, which were focused on the rule of law frame. 
Surprisingly, the rule of law frame was used very often by the SVP (46.47%), com-
pared to the other four big parties (together, 41.23%). This means that the SVP was, 
by far, the dominant campaigning party, not only focusing on its own arguments but 
also using the arguments of its opponents as counterframes. The framing of the cam-
paign from the perspective of the contra camp was prominent, but it was not reserved 
to the contra camp actors. This can partly be explained by the fact that the SVP was 
isolated as the only big party in the pro camp and, thus, received more attention, as a 
single party, than other parties did.
Table 6 further reveals that the total number of frames used by the SVP was distrib-
uted more or less equally among the three frames, whereas this was not the case for the 
other parties. Here, especially, the mass naturalization frame plays only a marginal 
role.
We then regrouped the actors by institutional origin (Table 7). For example, all 
members of the government were regrouped under Federal Council, and all members 
of the First Chamber of the Swiss Federal Parliament were regrouped under National 
Council, irrespective of party membership. The institution whose members are most 
frequently cited is the National Council. The Federal Council comes in a close second. 
All other institutions, including the Second Chamber of the Federal Parliament—the 
Council of States—are less prominently represented in the campaign. However, we 
have to note that 38% (1,270) of all frames were not connected to the institutional 
origins of actors, that is, these institutions were not explicitly mentioned in the media. 
Thus, the total N here is 2,049 frames. This result further supports the assumption of 
de Vreese and Semetko (2004) that lower prominence of key representatives of the 
political elite goes hand in hand with lower visibility of those representatives’ cam-
paigns in the media—and confirms H4. Civil society actors, in particular, did not get 
the same amount of attention from the media as did members of the key political insti-
tutions. Last, but not least, on the individual level, the most prominent actor was the 
member of the national government who was in charge of the campaign issue: Eveline 
Widmer-Schlumpf (Minister of Justice 2008–2010). Thus, even though government 
representatives are not expected to “campaign,” they are literally the most visible 
actors in direct democratic campaigns. They interpret their mandate to “inform” 
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citizens in a very broad sense. This result confirms earlier findings (Gerth et al., in 
press).
Conclusion
The results presented here show that the media depicted the campaign in a rather 
biased fashion (toward the contra side), even though the most active political actor 
(SVP) was campaigning on the pro side. The media presented the campaign as con-
stricted (toward three substantive frames), as controversial, and as a contest of arguments 
rather than a contest of personalities. Some variation, however, was found with regard 
to different types of media outlets and different types of actors involved in the campaign. 
We can say that the campaign was visible, especially during its last weeks. Furthermore, 
the campaign was most visible in the elite and regional media. Hence, our first hypoth-
esis was confirmed by our data. We found consistent results on the timing of the cover-
age of the campaign. This means that the media followed routine procedures in their 
coverage and that the logic of voting procedures—votes were predominantly submit-
ted by mail—had a decisive influence on the timing of campaign coverage. We found 
three dominant substantive frames in the coverage, two from the pro side and one 
from the contra side. All different kinds of media constricted their coverage toward 
these three frames.
In addition, we found issue-unspecific contest frames that were of minor importance. 
The sources of the framing were, obviously, journalists themselves, political actors, and 
authors of letters to the editor. But even if a large number of frames were not presented 
as framing by journalists, but by political actors and authors of letters to the editor, 
journalists still had influence, insofar as they selected the actors they cited and letters 
they published. Of the seven different types of media outlets, only news magazines 
offered frames that differed from the three dominant substantive frames. All types of 
outlets, with the exception of news magazines, again, presented the same frame (rule of 
law) as dominant. Contest frames were especially prominent in tabloid newspapers. The 
framing bias toward one frame and, thus, toward the contra camp was surprisingly strik-
ing, especially in regard to coverage with low resource intensity. We can say that efforts 
by journalists to develop their own lines of argument were almost inexistent. Thus, H3 
was confirmed by our data, but H2 was not confirmed. The media relied on the frames 
offered by political actors. Journalists contributed to making some frames more promi-
nent than others. This leads to a striking bias in the visibility of the contra and pro argu-
ments. Media coverage of direct democratic campaigns tended to be biased toward one 
camp, even in the public service media that were most expected to implement balanced 
and neutral coverage. H2 was not confirmed by our data (with the exception of contest 
frames). Our study further confirms the institutional bias that has been found by others. 
Government and parliamentary representatives are most visible, whereas civil society 
actors do play a minor role, and there are no differences between the pro and contra 
camps. The campaign was dominated by the big parties. They used framing but also 
counterframing as important strategies to increase their visibility in the media. H4 was 
confirmed by our data.
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News media coverage of direct democratic campaigns is a routine business when 
direct democratic votes are routine for political actors as well. The media offer a con-
siderable amount of coverage that allows citizens to participate in the arguments of 
different kinds of political actors. The media also offer a platform for debate and do 
comment on arguments. However, our study leads to the assumption that the media 
mostly report what is happening in the political arena. They not only choose prominent 
actors as sources; they also largely accept how political actors frame campaigns. They 
do not offer new ways of framing campaign issues but choose to weight existing 
frames differently.
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Notes
1. The sample consisted of the following news outlets: Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ; elite, German), 
NZZ am Sonntag (elite, German), Sonntagszeitung (elite, German), Le temps (elite, French), 
Aargauer Zeitung (regional, German), Basler Zeitung (regional, German), Berner Zeitung 
(regional, German), Die Südostschweiz (regional, German), Die Südostschweiz am Sonntag 
(regional, German), Neue Luzerner Zeitung (regional, German), Sonntag AZ (regional, 
German), St. Galler Tagblatt (regional, German), Tages Anzeiger (regional, German), 24 
heures (regional, French), Tribune de Genève (regional, French), Blick (tabloid, German), 
Sonntagsblick (tabloid, German), Le Matin (tabloid, French), Le Matin Dimanche (tab-
loid, French), 20 Minuten (free, German), 20 Minutes (free, French), Le Matin Bleu (free, 
French), Weltwoche (magazine, German), L’Hebdo (magazine, French), Tagesschau (TV 
news, German), Le Journal (TV news, French), Arena (TV show, German), Rundschau (TV 
show, German), and Infrarouge (TV show, French).
2. The four big parties are the Social Democrats (SP), the Liberal Free Democrats (FDP), 
the Christian Democrats (CVP), and the populist-right Swiss People’s Party (SVP; Linder, 
1998).
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